Turkish Presidential Election Briefing: Part 2
The Strongman has a strong chance
On Sunday, Turkish citizens will head back to the polls to vote in the 2nd and final round of their presidential elections. Utilizing a runoff system, the results of the 1st round predictably elevated the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the main opposition challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to this round, pitting them in a head-to-head contest. This piece will examine the 1st round results, analyze the composition of the third-party vote in the 1st round to better understand the swing demographic in the 2nd round, and detail positive developments for both candidates. In short, Erdoğan is the heavy favorite to win in the 2nd round, but Kılıçdaroğlu is not finished yet and could prevail given the right circumstances. A comprehensive analysis of the issues and candidates for this election can be found by clicking the button below.
Round 1 Results
On the 14th of May, Turkish citizens voted in the 1st round of their presidential election. For reference, to avoid a runoff election, the top vote-getter needed to acquire over 50% of the vote; no candidate was able to do that. However, defying the expectations of a more lackluster performance, President Erdoğan netted 49.5% of the vote. Kılıçdaroğlu followed him at 44.9%, as well as a third-party candidate Sinan Oğan who received 5.2% of the vote.
These results suggest three things. Firstly, pollsters and pundits severely underestimated Erdoğan. While I did predict a second round and urged caution with taking Turkish polling numbers at face value, this was not the conventional analysis surrounding the election-- with some even predicting an outright Kılıçdaroğlu majority. Kılıçdaroğlu and his alliance, for their part, seemed quite taken aback with how low their vote share was and struggled for the first few days to get their campaign back together
This leads to the second conclusion, which is that Erdoğan appears to be heavily favored going into the 2nd round. Mathematically, 49.5% is a lot closer to a majority than 44.9%. In addition, Erdoğan’s base doesn’t depend on voting blocs that often need more persuasion to vote, unlike the Kurdish and young voters that back Kılıçdaroğlu. It is quite possible that many of the pre-round 1 polls were accurate, but the turnout of 87% meant that many people who preferred Kılıçdaroğlu marginally over Erdoğan, did not follow through on their plans to vote. This seems especially the case in the Kurdish areas given the lower turnout levels there. Thus, between having voter blocs that are usually more motivated to turn out and already being so close to 50%, it's clear that Erdoğan has the mathematical upper hand.
The final thing the results indicate is that the voters who voted for third-party candidate Sinan Oğan serve as the kingmakers in this race. The path to an outright majority goes through them. In that vein, it’s worth exploring who these voters are, what views they hold, and the elements of the two major candidates’ campaigns that serve to attract and repel them.
The Median Oğan Voter
Sinan Oğan’s voters broadly fall into two camps: Victory Party loyalists and protest voters. Oğan was nominated by a coalition of right-wing and far-right parties, with the largest in this coalition being the Victory Party. This party is led by a charismatic leader named Ümit Özdağ and believes strongly in secularism and Turkish nationalism. Özdağ and the party have specifically taken aim at Erdoğan’s policy towards Syrian refugees. Since 2015, Türkiye and the European Union have struck a deal where Türkiye receives large sums of money from the EU in return for hosting Syrian refugees and preventing them from moving to Europe. Many in Türkiye’s secular far-right view this as an attempt from Erdoğan to Islamicize Türkiye; Erdoğan often calls for Turks to be sympathetic to Syrian refugees on account of their shared religion, something that secular nationalists reject. The Victory Party hoped to elevate this issue and alongside other minor parties, nominated the independent Sinan Oğan in order to draw attention to their issues. Because of this, many of Oğan’s voters are Victory Party loyalists who are voting their party line.
However, Oğan soon realized on the campaign trail that the initial hopes of the parties that nominated him would be hard to fulfill because Kılıçdaroğlu was willing to make anti-refugee politics a greater part of his platform than many had previously expected. To adapt, Oğan changed his strategy and attacked Kılıçdaroğlu for being willing to work with left-wing Kurdish parties and Erdoğan for being willing to work with Islamist ones. From this, Oğan gained a second type of voter-- the protest voter who is dismayed by what they perceive to be treasonous actions by major candidates against the national ideals of secularism and nationalism.
In summary, most of the people voting for Oğan were not exactly voting for the man himself. Rather, they were voting for their own party or in protest of Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan. This 5% sliver of the electorate will serve as the king-makers on Sunday, and thus both candidates have made moves to appease them.
The Erdoğan Campaign
Erdoğan has traditionally tried to portray himself as a symbol of the State, and thus historically has preferred not to stoop to ask for endorsements, lest he portray an image of him being malleable for domestic political ends. In addition, after such a strong showing in the last round, excessive campaigning could be seen in a questionable light, especially with the grumblings of accusations of electoral misconduct (instances of which have been proven to have occurred, yet have been rectified and all involve a small number of votes). However, after an unorthodox level of political courting, he was able to secure Oğan’s endorsement. The reaction to this from analysts has been mixed.
On one hand, the endorsement of a major third-party candidate will inherently be helpful. That being said, as noted before, many people did not necessarily vote for Oğan because they aligned with his views per se but rather out of loyalty to Özdağ and his Victory Party or due to disgruntlement between the two candidates. While there will be people, especially in the latter camp, who this endorsement may sway, the consensus is that Oğan’s endorsement will not sway many of his own voters.
With all that being said, Erdoğan doesn’t need much more support to get over the 50% mark. Kılıçdaroğlu arguably needed everything to go right for him and everything to go wrong for Erdoğan to have a decent chance against him in the 2nd round. With Oğan’s endorsement, even when contextualized and qualified, Erdoğan’s chance of victory jumps much higher.
The Kılıçdaroğlu Campaign
Kılıçdaroğlu, after some difficult days in the immediate aftermath of the 1st round, has attempted to cobble together a crucial endorsement, a rhetorical gaffe by an Erdoğan ally, and even tougher anti-Syrian rhetoric to give a breath of life back into his campaign. In the hours and days following the 1st round, the mood in the Kılıçdaroğlu was worry and despair. Mathematically, they were the significant underdogs, a position few expected for them prior to Round 1. In addition, election-night complications regarding the counting of votes arguably served as a message to them from Erdoğan that he still exerts enough control over the electoral process to be able to shape the narrative. Considering Kılıçdaroğlu needs to be able to convince many Turkish citizens who are skeptical that voting still matters to get out and cast a ballot for him, his campaign was incredibly worried about the sudden slowing in momentum going into Round 2.
Kılıçdaroğlu attempted to rectify this by trying to gain the endorsements of both Oğan and Özdağ, as he hoped the former’s endorsement could present an image of a truly united front against Erdoğan while the latter’s endorsement would be able to sway tangible sections of the voter base. While he was unable to secure Oğan’s approval, he was able to gain Özdağ’s, which will be of arguably more help than Oğan’s in a pure numbers game.
Kılıçdaroğlu also received a lucky break of sorts when a minor party named HÜDA PAR made a statement that risks tarnishing Erdoğan. HÜDA PAR is a minor Kurdish party that is considered one of the most Islamist parties in the Turkish parliament. HÜDA PAR is also largely seen as falling in the Erdoğan camp, as it frequently coalitions with Erdogan’s party in parliament and during elections. On Wednesday, the party declared its disagreement with the current Turkish oath of office, specifically objecting to the fact it must be said in Turkish, as well as the mentions of secularism in the oath. Considering the swing voter is likely to be someone who cares a lot about Turkish secularism and national identity, these remarks were widely considered an embarrassment to the Erdoğan campaign, and Erdoğan himself had to come out to admonish his coalition partner publicly. Still, given how long-standing the connection is between HÜDA PAR and Erdoğan, there is no way that Erdoğan can fully undo the damage the remarks have caused him.
In the midst of the actions of others, Kılıçdaroğlu has attempted to bolster his nationalist credentials by doubling down on his promise to deport Syrian refugees back to Syria. This renewed campaign push was partly designed to get Özdağ and his Victory Party on board but was also meant to appeal more generally to the swing voter in the election, for whom the deportation of Syrian refugees often ranks high as an issue of key concern. Between Özdağ’s endorsement, HÜDA PAR’s mishap, and a strong nationalist message of his own, Kılıçdaroğlu has managed to stay in contention, even as an underdog.
Conclusion
Erdoğan is heavily favored to win another term as President. For him to lose, Kılıçdaroğlu needs to keep his base turnout high, get both Kurds and right-wing nationalists to turn out in large numbers for him, and also see decreased turnout from Erdogan supporters. Any one of these three victory prerequisites is already a tall ask-- having all three occur seems incredibly unlikely.
An Erdoğan victory would continue to set Türkiye on an independent geopolitical and economic path. Erdoğan himself is known to be an unpredictable force on the world stage, often driving Türkiye’s foreign relations in a very pragmatic way seeking to score concessions from major world powers rather than the more ideological way that many Western countries are more accustomed to. On the other hand, it is likely that investor confidence in Türkiye would continue to reduce, as Erdoğan shows no signs of departing from his unique unorthodox economic ideas that have contributed to drastic volatility in the Turkish economy. Decreased willingness from Western sources to invest in the Turkish economy may end up creating room for Russian and Chinese actors to play a greater role, yet those investors will also have to deal with the dramatic ebbs and flows of Erdoğan’s economy.
By contrast, the more unlikely Kılıçdaroğlu victory would probably lead to greater confidence in the Turkish economy going forward, and it's expected that Türkiye would pivot more towards its Western allies. That being said, Kılıçdaroğlu has taken heavy aim at the current migration deals that underpin the current relationship between the country and the European Union, and any attempt by Kılıçdaroğlu to follow through on that plank of his platform would be likely to create significant friction in regards to any attempt to integrate further into the West.